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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. KLEIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY AVALON KLEIN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 13994 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment incorporating the terms 
of a purported stipulation of the parties to a modification of the 
economic aspects of a previously entered decree of divorce. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The original decree of divorce in this matter, in its 
final amended form, was entered on November 22, 1972. On July 5, 1973, 
this Court denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and affirmed 
the judgment below. Klein v. Klein, 30 Utah 2d.l, 511 P.2d 1284 
(1973), Thereafter the Defendant petitioned the trial court to invoke 
the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original decree for the 
purpose of modifying that decree. The trial court subsequently 
ordered a hearing of matters relating to the economic aspects of 
the original decree for the purpose of determining whether there 
were grounds for invoking that decree's reserved jurisdiction. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-gener ted OCR, may contain erro s.
From said Order, the Plaintiff took an interlocutory 
appeal to this Court, which appeal this Court declined to hear on 
February 11, 1974. 
The hearing with respect to economic matters took place on 
July 23, 26 and 29, 1974, resulting in a Judgment, dated November 
11, 1974 modifying the original decree of divorce, by revaluing the 
marital estate and redividing the marital property. On December 
6, 1974, the hearings on the Plaintiff?s various motions for relief 
from the Judgment of November 11, 1974, were commenced. Those hearings 
were suspended on December 9, 1974 by an alleged stipulation of the 
parties to modify the original decree of divorce. A timely motion 
by the Plaintiff to rescind the alleged stipulation was made and 
denied and, on December 18, 1974, a Judgment was entered incorpora-
ting the terms of the alleged stipulation. 
On December 27, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to set 
aside the Judgment of December 18, 1974 and, in the alternative 
a Motion for a New Trial. Those motions were denied on January 
28, 1975. On February 14, 1975, the Plaintiff filed his Notice of 
Appeal to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the consent Judg-
ment of December 18, 1974, set aside as having been entered with-
out his consent. The Plaintiff requests that this Court make an 
equitable modification of the original divorce decree or, in the 
alternative, the Plaintiff requests that certain instructions from 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this Court to the trial court accompany any remand for further 
determinations by the trial court in this matter. The Plaintiff 
also seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
This action is one of potentially great impact upon 
the divorce law of this jurisdiction, presenting several crucial 
questions of first impression. It involves a trial court's 
exercise of limited jurisdiction reserved in an earlier trial 
court divorce decree in such a way as to overrule both an opinion 
of this Court and a ruling of a court of equal jurisdiction. The 
Defendant has asked and received a trial de novo from the District 
Court after having a denial of a Motion for New Trial affirmed on 
appeal. 
This action involves a pair of trial court judgments 
revaluing an estate at eight times the value found two years earlier 
in the original divorce decree. Those judgments adopt asset values 
that deviate not the slightest from those asserted by the Defendant 
despite a gross disparity in the evidence. Those judgments impose 
financial obligations upon the Plaintiff in excess of his income; 
they award to the Defendant marital assets which did not exist at 
the time of the original decree, which the Defendant refused to 
help acquire, and which in significant part were acquired with 
assets of the Plaintiff's mother; they perpetuate a business part-
nership where the marital partnership has been dissolved; they force 
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the almost certain liquidation of a potentially very valuable estate 
at a fraction of its potential worth; and finally they deprive 
the Plaintiff of his ability to practice his trade. 
This action was initially filed in the District Court 
for Salt Lake County in 1972. A Memorandum Decision was rendered 
in May of that year after both sides were fully heard and all issues 
were fully litigated. After hearing Defendant's motions to amend 
the Findings and Judgment, the court entered its Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in November of 
that year. On July 5, 1973, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and affirmed the 
judgment below. (Decision No. 13146.) The Court noted that limited 
recourse was available to Defendant under the trial court's reser-
vation of "limited j urisdictionff to modify its decree: 
"If within one year either party proves 
to be suffering from serious financial distress 
because of the decree to be~based on this decision 
and the ensuing developments arising therefrom 
not capable of evaluation at this time,..." 
(Emphasis added, Memorandum Decision, page 99 of 
the official record, hereinafter referred to as 
Record, at 100, page 27 of the abstracted record, 
hereinafter referred to as Abstract, at page 27). 
Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Petition for Review of 
Economic Matters and Modification of the Decree, asking the Court 
to invoke the above-quoted limited jurisdiction reserved in the 
original decree and to order the recalculation of the net worth of 
the marital estate as of the date of the divorce decree. As a 
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basis for such jurisdiction, the Defendant offered an affidavit 
dated November 8, 1973, which asserted that her former standard of 
living and her current expenses exceeded her current income, as 
evidence that she was suffering "serious financial distress" 
within the meaning of the reservation. The Plaintiff submitted a 
counter-affidavit dated November 27, 1973 exposing the non-factual 
nature of the Defendant's assertions as to her former standard 
of living and her current expenses by disclosing his adjusted gross 
income, as set forth in his recent income tax returns, and by dis-
closing the Defendant's actual debts, as set forth in the records 
of her creditors. 
On December 7, 1974, the court issued an Order Relating 
to Review of Economic Matters affording both parties an "unres-
tricted" opportunity to present to the Court evidence bearing upon 
all economic matters arising and/or resulting from the marriage of 
the parties for the stated purpose of redividing the marital estate. 
The Order makes no reference to changed circumstances such as would 
serve as a basis for a modification proceeding under Section 30-3-5, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). (Emphasis added). Instead, it predicates 
its grant of jurisdiction to modify the original decree upon 
the reservation of limited jurisdiction in the original decree. 
The Plaintiff took an interlocutory appeal from the Order 
of December 7, 1974 asserting that the limited jurisdiction 
reserved in the original decree had been exceeded. This Court 
declined to hear that appeal on February 11, 1974. 
-5-
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The hearing with respect to economic matters took place 
on July 23, 26 and 29, 1974, resulting in Findings, Conclusions 
and a Judgment dated November 11, 1974. Thereafter, on November 
11, 1974, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment, increasing the valuation of the marital estate 
eight fold over that found in the original decree and six fold 
over the amount ever attributed to the marital estate by a certified 
public accountant or mortgage lending institution and, without 
considering the financial distress of the Plaintiff, directed an 
arbitrary and sweeping redistribution of the marital estate. 
On November 14, 1974, the Plaintiff filed his Objections 
to the November 11 Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and on 
November 15, 1974, he filed a Motion for a New Trial or in the 
Alternative, Motion to Take Additional Testimony and Evidence. 
Hearing of the above motions began on December 6, 1974. 
On Monday, December 9, the hearing was resumed and an 
unusual sequence of events ensued. On that day, prior to the 
noon recess, the Defendant's counsel made an offer of settlement 
to the Plaintiff's counsel. The Plaintiff's counsel related 
some of the terms of the offer to the Plaintiff and advised him 
to accept them. The Plaintiff instructed his counsel to continue 
negotiations, believing that whatever proposal his counsel was 
ultimately able to obtain from the Defendant would be developed 
in detail, reduced to written form, and submitted to both parties 
for their final approval. 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Following the noon recess, and before the Plaintiff's 
motions had been fully heard, formal court procedure was suspended. 
In the court's presence, the Defendant's attorneys orally pro-
posed terms of settlement, in part by proposing individual settle-
ment terms, but chiefly by referring to numbers of paragraphs of 
the November 11, 1974 Judgment, a judgment which the Plaintiff 
had never been advised existed, which he had never seen, and which, 
when presented to him orally in the form of paragraph numbers alone, 
he could not comprehend. 
The sudden abandonment of formal court procedure had not 
been explained to the Plaintiff and was bewildering to him. The 
oral proposal of settlement terms by paragraph numbers of a judg-
ment of which he was not aware added to his bewilderment. At the 
insistence of his counsel, the Plaintiff believed that his con-
currence in the proceedings at this point was necessary for the 
negotiation process to go forward. 
The Plaintiff's shaken, dejected and disoriented mental 
state at the time of the above described oral proceedings is 
documented in the transcript of the Proceedings of December 9th, 
the Plaintiff's Affidavit, dated January 17", 1975, the Affidavit 
of the Appellant, dated March 11, 1975 and confirmed by the Affi-
davit of Stephen R. Anderson, Vice President of Valley Bank § Trust, 
dated February 24, 1975, with whom the Plaintiff talked shortly 
after these proceedings were concluded. The latter two documents 
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are items (h) and (i) respectively submitted with the Plaintiff*s 
Rule 75 Memorandum of Authorities, dated March 17, 1975 on file 
with this Court. That the Plaintiff's incapacity under the 
circumstances to intelligently give his acceptance to a settlement 
agreement only a few of the terms of which he was actually 
apprised, is apparent from the following interchange recorded 
at page 10, lines 9 through 12 of the hearing transcript: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Klein, you have 
heard your counsel read into the record, part of it 
by reference to paragraphs. I donft know whether 
you have been able to follow it or not. 
MR. KLEIN: I haven't followed it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. KLEIN: I am relying on my counsel. At 
this point, I haven't been able to read it. 
Though the transcript later shows the Plaintiff to have 
replied affirmatively when asked by the Court if he understood 
and accepted the stipulation, the Plaintiff had no opportunity 
in the interim to read the contents of the stipulation. This 
subsequent interchange, therefore, did nothing to alter the true 
nature of the Plaintiff's Mconsent,M and render it intelligently o 
voluntarily given. 
The first time that the Plaintiff had the capacity to 
comprehend the effect of his oral stipulation was the following 
day, in St. George, Utah, after he had recovered his emotional 
equilibrium. He immediately tried to consult his attorney 
in Salt Lake City, but was unsuccessful. On Wednesday, the 
11th of December, the terms and the effect of the stipulation 
were first comprehended by the Plaintiff as a result of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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conversation with his counsel. It was clear to the Plaintiff that 
numerous terms of the stipulation of which he had not been informed, 
made his compliance impossible, regardles-s of his good faith. For 
this reason, the Plaintiff informed his counsel that the stipula-
tion could not be agreed to. 
The Plaintiff telephoned his counsel on December 12, asking 
to see the written stipulation and was informed that it had already 
been signed by his counsel earlier that day. On December 13, the 
Plaintiff was informed by his counsel that because he had already 
signed the stipulation, he believed that, as an officer of the court, 
he was unable to challenge it. He, therefore, advised the Plaintiff 
that as a legal matter, the stipulation could only be challenged by 
a new attorney. 
In order to allow the Plaintiff to apply for a rescission 
of his stipulation, his counsel made a motion to withdraw on December 
17, The court, however, required counsel to sign the stipulated 
Judgment as a condition to permitting him to withdraw. (Proceedings 
of December 18, 1974, at page 2, lines 6-11, 386 Abstract at 386). 
On the afternoon of the 17th, the Plaintiff informed the court of his 
desire to rescind the stipulation, to which the court did not respond 
other than to advise him to deal through new counsel. Later that 
same day, prior to Judge Taylor's signing of the judgment and decree 
based upon the wirtten stipulation, Plaintiff's attorney, James R. 
Brown, in the presence of Defendant's attorney, James P. Cowley, 
presented the motion to rescind the stipulation without argument. 
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Mr. Brown explained that his client, Mr. Klein, had specifically 
stated that he did not wish Mr. Brown to sign the stipulation. 
Mr. Cowley explained that he would submit the stipulation to the 
court only if ordered to do so. Thereupon, Judge Taylor denied the 
motion to rescind the stipulation and ordered that the document be 
received and made part of the file. (Transcript of hearing of 
Proceedings of December 18, 1974, at page 2, 386 Abstract at 387-88). 
On December 18, 1974, a Judgment modifying the original 
Judgment and Decree of November 22, 1972, was entered by the 
court, based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
November 11, 1974 and incorporating by reference the purported 
stipulation of the parties, signed December 12, 1974. 
On December 27, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to 
set aside the Judgment of December 18, 1974, and a Motion for a 
New Trial.- Those Motions were denied on January 28, 1975 and on 
February 14, 1975, the Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal to this 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974 INCORPORATING THE 
PURP0RTED~STTPULATIQN OF THE PLAINTIFF IS INVALID AND NoN^BlNDING. 
It is the clear majority rule that in order for a judg-
ment based on a stipulation of the parties to be valid and binding, 
actual consent to a stipulated judgment must exist at the very 
moment the court undertakes to make the stipulation the judgment 
-10-
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of the court. For a summary of the majority rule, see 47 Am. 
Jur.2d "Judgments", Sec. 1083. The majority rule is stated 
in Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504, 87 N.W.2d 
311 (1958). There it was held that the court has no authority 
to enter a consent judgment where, to the knowledge of the Court, 
a party to the settlement agreement refuses to be bound thereby. 
It further held that entry of a consent judgment under such 
circumstances constitutes an irregularity of the court, justifying 
a new trial. Plaintiff in the present case has a right to a 
new trial identical to that enunciated in Van Donselaar. The 
trial court clearly abused its discretion by denying the Plaintiff 
that right. Van Donselaar cites in support of the majority rule 
Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1951), 
rehearing denied: 
A valid consent judgment cannot be rendered 
by a court when the consent of one of the parties 
thereto is wanting. It is not sufficient to support 
the judgment that the party's consent thereto may at one 
time havebeen given; consent must exist at the very 
moment the court undertakes to make the agreement 
the judgment of "the court". (Emphasis added). 
The majority view is confirmed in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez 
224 N.C. 225, 29 S.E.2d 901, 905; Williamson v. Williamson, 
224 N.C. 474, 31 S.E.2d 367, 368; King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 
35 S.E.2d 893; Lee v. Rhodes, 227 N.C. 373, 41 S.E.2d 747, 
748; Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N.C. 373, 49 S.E.2d 794, 796; 
Jacobs v. Steinbrink, 242 App. Div. 197, 273 N.Y.S. 498, 507; 
In re Thompsons Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493, 498; 
-11-
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MacArthur v. Thompson, 140 Neb. 408, 299 N.W. 519, 523, 524; 
130 A.L.R. 413, 419. 
It should be noted that no issue of the sanctity of 
judgments is presented by the facts of this case, since the 
court was notified of the Plaintiff's withdrawal of consent prior 
to the entry of judgment. 
The alleged stipulation entered into by the Plaintiff 
has no force or effect by virtue of the signing of the written 
stipulation by the Plaintiff's former attorney, Mr. James R. Brown, 
since Mr. Brown did not have the authority to endorse the stipula-
tion at the time of signing. Counsel for both parties conceded 
this. (Transcript of Proceedings of December 18, 1974, at page 2, 
386 Abstract 388.) 
If the purported stipulation entered into by the Plaintiff 
has any legal effect, it is as an oral contract alone, formed 
during the hearing of December 9, 1974. 
The legal standard governing the granting of relief from 
stipulations intended to serve as the basis of judgments is basically 
the same as that governing the granting of equitable relief from 
an ordinary contract. 161 A.L.R. 1160, 1192. Grounds found by the 
courts to support rescission of a contract in equity include 
mistake of fact or law, fraud, duress, undue influence, excusable 
neglect and incapacity. 161 A.L.R. 1160, 1171. The special con-
siderations applied by the courts to the rescission of stipula-
tions entered during the trial process is that the request for 
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withdrawal must be timely, such relief must be necessary to 
prevent injustice to the party seeking it, and the adverse party 
should not be placed at a disadvantage by having acted in compliance 
with the stipulation entered into. Sinnock v. Young, 61 Cal. App.2d 
130, 142 P.2d 85 (1943), 161 A.L.R. 1160, 1169, 1171. 
These standards are applied with particular leniency in 
this jurisdiction in the context of divorce proceedings. Mathie 
v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961) states the general 
principle governing the degree to which private contractual arrange-
ments in divorce actions are entitled the deference of the court. 
It held that: 
The marriage itself and the obligations 
inherent in it are matters which it has always 
been recognized cannot be left entirely to 
private contract. This applies also to the 
property rights of the parties because their 
welfare, and to some degree the public welfare 
is involved.... Under it (Sec. 30-3-5, Utah 
Code Ann.) there can be no doubt of the 
court's prerogative to make whatever disposi-
tion of the property, including the rights 
in such (property settlement contract, as 
it deems fair, equitable and just. 363 P.2d 
at 784. 
Specifically, the rule in Utah is that in a divorce action, 
the trial court should make such provision for alimony as the 
present circumstances warrant, and any stipulation of the parties 
in respect thereto serves only as a recommendation to the court. 
Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 265, 139 P.2d 222 (1943), following 
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P.2d 792 (1941), 
and citing note in 109 A.L.R. 1068. Rule followed in Madsen 
y. Madsen, 2 Utah 2d 423, 267 P.2d 917 (1954), Openshaw v. 
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Openshaw, 102 Utah 22, 126 P.2d 1068 (1942), Callister v. Callister, 
1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953). The rule applies equally 
to modifications of divorce decrees. Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah 
263, 177 P.2d 731 (1947). 
The policy of the Utah courts is clearly to defer less 
to private stipulations in divorce matters than to private stipulations 
outside of the divorce context. This policy is reflected in 
Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that 
except in actions for divorce parties may waive findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in writing or in open court. (Emphasis 
added). In Utah, and generally, the showing necessary to rescind 
a marital property settlement is, therefore, clearly a lesser 
showing than that required to rescind an ordinary contract in 
equity, the normal standard for rescinding a settlement agreement. 
This Plaintiff satisfies the prerequisites for rescinding 
his settlement agreement under the general standard governing the 
rescission of contracts in equity or the specific standard governing 
the rescission of settlement contracts in the context of divorce. His 
application to rescind the stipulation was made within one week 
after it occurred. There is no evidence that the Defendant had 
detrimentally relied upon the existence of the stipulation. 
Indeed, she had little opportunity to do so in view of the Plaintiff's 
almost immediate application for equitable rescission. While 
allowing the Plaintiff to rescind his stipulation would not have 
prejudiced the Defendant, to bind the Plaintiff to the stipulation 
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would be manifestly unjust. A further consequence of binding 
the Plaintiff to the stipulation would be manifest injustice 
to third parties, inviting a spate of third party lawsuits. These 
two latter points will be fully developed later in the Plaintiff's 
argument. 
Under the circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff1s pur-
ported stipulation, he lacked the capacity to contract. Those 
circumstances show the following: 
1) The Plaintiff was justifiably ignorant of the bulk 
of the terms of the proposed settlement. 
The Plaintiff first heard most of the terms of the proposed 
settlement during informal court proceedings when the Defendants 
counsel announced them orally in the form of numbers to paragraphs 
of the Judgment of November 11, 1974 which Judgment the Plaintiff 
had never seen and had never been advised existed. Therefore, he 
could not fully comprehend the nature of the settlement proposed 
nor evaluate its impact on his exceedingly complex personal 
estate. The Plaintiff1s ignorance of the bulk of the terms of 
the proposed settlement and his resulting inability to comprehend 
it is reflected in the Transcript of the Proceedings of December 
9 and 18, 1974 at page 10, lines 9 through 12, 372 Abstract at 381: 
THE COURT; All right. Mr. Klein, you 
have heard your counsel read into the record, part of 
it by reference to paragraphs. I don't know 
whether you have been able to follow it or not. 
-15-
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MR. KLEIN; I haven1t followed it, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. KLEIN; I am relying on my counsel. At 
this point, I haven't been able to read it. 
Though the Plaintiff subsequently stated his acceptance 
of the stipulation, this does not reflect a valid acceptance 
intelligently given, since the Plaintiff never did have the op-
portunity to read the full terms of the proposed settlement. 
2) The Plaintiff labored under a fundamental misconception 
as to the nature of the stipulation proceedings and the legal 
effect of his oral assent. 
The Plaintiff, when advised in very general terms of the Defendant's 
proposed settlement, instructed his counsel to continue negotiations, 
believing that whatever terms his counsel was ultimately able 
to obtain would be reduced to writing and submitted to him for 
his final approval and signature. This mistake on the part of 
the Plaintiff was justified under the circumstances. The Plaintiff 
is a layman. The stipulation proceedings and their legal effect 
were not explained to him; he had to interpret them for himself. 
The Plaintiff knew that the court and counsel for both sides 
were aware of his ignorance of many of the proposal's terms, 
as the passage from the transcript quoted above demonstrates. 
The Plaintiff made the assumption that a marital estate as complex 
as his would not be finally disposed of by a court in such an 
informal, ad hoc manner. Finally, the Plaintiff believed that 
following the informal proceedings, which were new and confusing 
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to him, formal court proceedings would be resumed, at which time 
a detailed settlement would be formally proposed. When asked 
for his assent to specific settlement terms by the opposing 
counsel, the Plaintiff believed, reasonably under the circum-
stances, that an assent in principle was being sought from him 
so that the negotiation process might proceed to its final stage. 
That the Plaintiff's interpretation of the settlement proceedings 
was mistaken is not surprising nor was it unjustified. 
3) The Plaintiff's mental condition at the time his 
oral assent to the settlement agreement was given was such as 
to seriously impair his ability to comprehend the nature of the 
Defendant's offer. 
The Plaintiff, during the proceedings of December 9, 1974, was 
exhausted and emotionally drained by the taxing demands of 
keeping a large complex of speculative real estate holdings alive 
on a shoestring of liquid assets while such assets were under 
the constant cloud of divorce and modification proceedings. 
Over the noon hour the Plaintiff was shaken and dejected by his 
counsel's assessment of the predisposition of the court toward 
his case. 
The informal stipulation procedure was new and confusing 
to the Plaintiff and much of its stipulation's content, presented 
orally by paragraph number alone, could not be determined by 
him. This confusion, fatigue, and depression combined to produce 
in the Plaintiff an extremely disorientated mental state at the 
time of his oral acceptance. 
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The foregoing facts demonstrate defects in the Plaintifffs 
capacity to intelligently and voluntarily contract under the 
circumstances, which defects are sufficient to set aside a con-
tract in equity. 
It is submitted that the Plaintiff's defective acceptance, 
his timely application for rescission and his timely withdrawal 
of his consent to a stipulated judgment render the Judgment of 
December 18, 1974 null and void under the strong majority view 
expressed in Van Donselaar, supra. Parenthetically, it should be 
noted that the sanctity of property settlement agreements is 
founded upon concern for prejudice to the opposing party and 
to some extent upon a concern for the stability of title to real 
property. Where, as here, the request for rescission is almost 
immediate, having been made prior to any detrimental reliance 
by the opposing party and prior to the entry of judgment, and 
the request is made for good cause shown, the policy underlying 
the sanctity of property settlement agreements does not apply 
and may not properly serve as a bar to rescission. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER 11 AND DECEMBER 18, 1974 WERE MANI-
FESTLY' INEQUITABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Judgment of November 11, 1974, was merged into the 
Judgment of December 18, 1974, and extinguished. Myers v. Southard, 
110 S.W.2d 1185 CTex. 1937), Price v. First NatTl Bank, 62 Kan. 
735, 64P. 637, Garvin v. Garvin, 27 S.C. 472, 4 S.E. 148, Gould 
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v. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443, Bertram v, Waterman, 18 Iowa 529, Denegre 
v, Haun, 13 Iowa 240. Accepting the position that the Judgment 
of December 18, is void, there is no final disposition of this 
case before the court, if a technical view of the posture of 
this case is taken. Should the posture of this case be considered 
interlocutory at this time, the Plaintiff submits that the denial 
of review at this stage would extend the cloud of litigation 
over the marital estate into its fourth year, and that such circum-
stances constitute hardship to both parties justifying appellate 
review at this time. Under the rule of Schurtz v. Thorley, 90 
Utah 381, 61 P.2d 1262. Q.936). 
The first issue which the Plaintiff seeks to raise is the 
inequity of the modifications of the original divorce decree hereto-
fore entered by the trial court. It seeks such review for the pur-
pose of requesting this Court to undertake to make an equitable divi-
sion of the marital estate or, in the alternative, to remand this 
action to the trial court together with certain instructions 
as to what constitutes an equitable division of the marital 
estate. 
To determine whether the trial court!s modifications of 
the original decree thus far have been inequitable, it is first 
necessary to discuss the legal standard that governs this Courtfs 
determinations of the issue of inequity and issues of fact when 
sitting in equity to review an award of marital property. 
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The role of an appellate court in this jurisdiction 
sitting in review of awards of alimony or marital property 
has been the subject of numerous opinions of this Court. Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg, 11 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930), is a leading opinion 
addressing this issue. There the plaintiff wife appealed the 
portion of the jnarital property awarded to her, alleging that 
she was entitled to a larger share of the marital estate since 
her joint efforts had contributed to the acquisition of the entire 
estate. The husband defendant argued that the trial court's 
award must be affirmed on appeal unless there was a showing of 
"a gross abuse of discretion or that the allowance was 'grossly 
excessive or grossly inadequate'". The court rejected the standard 
of review asserted by the defendant and held at 61 P.2d 216-17: 
Such stated rule is disputed by the Plaintiff, 
who urges that the kind of division or the amount of 
an allowance to be made is dependent upon the facts, 
circumstances, and conditions of -each particular case, 
and, if upon a consideration of them, the division or allow-
* '
 a n c e
 ~&s made by the court below is inequitable or unjust, 
this court is justified, and it is its duty to inter-
fere ,"~and that, to do so, it is not essential to show 
j^J^" a.buse of discretion in the court below, that it is" 
enough," iF~upon the record presented the court below 
erred in making the division or allowance and that 
equity and justice require an interference and~~a 
modification thereof, (Citations omitted).'" 
(1,2) We think the rule contended for by the 
plaintiff is the correct rule, and is in line with 
the later cases from this jurisdiction. 
'(3) Thfe question' thus is as to whether on the 
facts found the division and allowance were equitable 
and just. As to that, a divorce proceeding being an 
action in equity, the parties, under our Cons titjtj^on, 
•20- / f'f¥mf - - I 
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are entitled to our judgment, as well as that of 
the trial courtT (Citations omitted). (Emphasis 
added), ~ 
Under this standard of review, Dahlberg held that the 
trial court had abused its discretion in failing to award the 
wife a larger share of the martial property and directed the 
trial court to increase the alimony awarded to the wife. 
The dissenting opinion in Dahlberg argued that the proper 
standard of review was somewhat more strict to determine whether 
the award of the trial court was ftclearly unjust or inequitable.M 
61 P.2d at 218, 
Also at issue in Dahlberg was the applicable legal standard 
for reviewing issues of fact when this Court sits in equity to examine 
awards of marital property in actions for divorce. It approves 
the following holding from Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282, 
p, 1034, 1037 (1929) at 217: 
In the case last cited, we said: "This case 
is one in equity. In this jurisdiction the MndTng 
effect of findings of the trial court in law^ cas"es^ " 
is different from that in equity' cases. ... lii the" 
latter, our duty and responsibility in approving 
or disaproving findings when challenged are moFe 
comprehensiveV In such case, on an appearand a 
review on questions of both law and fact, and "cm 
a^challenge of findings, the review in effect is 
a triar^de novo on the record.... 
The statement of the rule as there made is 
but a restatement of it asfrequently announced in 
the prior cTted cases and~as it in other cases 
often was applied in reviewing and considering 
fact findings in equity cases without any express 
sTa'tement of tlTe" rule. (Emphasis addecf) . 
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Having established the appropriate standard of review applic-
able both to the issue of equity and to issues of fact with respect 
to marital property awards it becomes necessary to apply that standard 
to the facts of this case. 
In its Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974, 
the trial court has modified the original decree of divorce in this 
case in such a way as to cause the almost certain collapse and 
liquidation of the marital estate at a fraction of its potential 
value. It has done so by dividing the marital property by a routine 
division in kind, awarding roughly half of the assets to the Plain-
tiff and half to the Defendant. This manner of dividing a 
marital estate may be well suited to the usual marital estate 
in which the breadwinnerfs salary is the most significant asset 
and the property divided in kind is merely personal property 
of the parties. But the consequences of imposing a division 
in kind upon this highly unusual marital estate are disasterous. 
To understand this point requires a brief explanation of the 
nature of this marital estate. 
The Plaintiff has considerable skill and expertise in 
the business of real estate development and during the marriage 
has brought substantial assets into the marital estate. The 
principal assets brought into the estate by the Plaintiff consist 
of Major Enterprises, Inc., Award Homes, Inc. and Dynamic, Inc., 
ac complex of corporations designed to acquire and develop real 
estate. It was founded by the Plaintiff who owns fifty percent 
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(50%) of the stock of the component corporations. The apartments 
held by this complex, together with the home of the parties, 
represent the hard assets of the marital estate, being income 
producing or reasonably marketable. The salary received by the 
Plaintiff as an officer of these corporations represents his 
sole source of income and the only source of funds by which the 
Plaintiff can service the enormous purchase money debt he has 
incurred to assemble a large complex of speculative real estate 
holdings. The other principal assets of the marital estate 
consist of those speculative real estate holdings—the "Pershing 
Nelson/1 "Sandberg" and "Seegmiller" properties. The adjacent 
"Pershing Nelson" and "Sandberg" properties together constitute 
420 acres of raw, arid, sagebrush covered desert roughly three 
miles from the developed portion of St. George, Utah. The 
"Seegmiller" property consists of 1181 acres of raw desert land, 
roughly the size of St. George proper, situated on a high arid 
plateau, approximately 4-1/2 miles from the City of St. George 
and accessible from that city by a switchback dirt road. 
The present values of these parcels of raw land is iiichoate 
and extremely speculative. Their potential worth as developed 
land is substantial but the chance that such potential will be 
realized is highly uncertain. The Nelson/Sandberg and the Seegmiller 
lands are approximately of half, and of equal size, respectively, 
to the present city of St. George. They are situated at a consider-
able distance from existing development and are without access 
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to water, utilities and urban services. These parcels can be suc-
cessfully developed only as single, large self-sufficient com-
munities. The relevant market is a speculative wholesale real 
estate market as the Defendant's expert witness concedes. The 
wholesale real estate market in the St. George area is a poorly 
defined, disorganized, boom and bust market. This is due in part 
to the presence of several other extraordinarily large parcels 
of developable land near St. George not owned by the Plaintiff 
that are sufficient to saturate the entire wholesale real estate 
market of that area. The f,marketn for large, isolated tracts 
of desert land is the opposite of that for a standardized good, 
sold on an organized, well-defined market. Offers to purchase 
these parcels at their potential developable values are few, if 
any, and far between. Their "market value11 is largely hypothetical, 
depending far more on the skill, timing and promotional talent 
of the individual promoter than on any consideration of supply 
and demand. As the checkered history of the various Bloomington 
projects show, large-scale development projects in the St. George 
area are an enormous gamble; they either catch on or die. There-
fore, whether the developed values of these two parcels will ever 
be realized depends essentially on the promotional skills and 
the development expertise of the Plaintiff, not upon an abstract 
and largely hypothetical market value. 
The original decree of divorce, dated November 22, 1972, 
valued the marital estate at $225,000.00 and divided this amount 
in approximately equal portions between the parties, the Defendant's 
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share consisting largely of the parties home and certain liquidated 
stock* Following the modification proceedings of July, 1974, 
the trial court made a spectacular revaluation of the marital 
estate arriving at a net worth of $1,748,809,98, as compared to 
the net worth of $225,090.00 contained in the original decree. 
In paragraph 8 of its Findings of Fact, dated November 11, 1974, 
the principal assets of the marital estate were valued as follows: 
Findings of the 
Plaintiff1s Defendant's Court -
Valuation Valuation Nov., 1974 
Stock in Major Enterprises, 
Inc. Principal holdings are 
apartment complexes, some 
raw land 95,000 543,000 543,000 
Stock in Holidair Lands, 
Inc. Principal holdings 
are raw land and contingent 
rights to raw land negative 196,762 196,762 
Contract receivable from 
Holidair Lands, Inc. 390,000 504,000 504,000 
Seegmiller lands. Large 
tract of raw land in vicin-
ity of St. George, Utah 59,000 416,000 416,000 
O.K. Enterprises -Princi-
pal holdings are apart-
ments, one-half of which 
the Plaintiff doesnft own, 
and some raw land 33,250 141,050 141,050 
Total Marital Estate assets 503,469 2,043,912 2,037,535 
Total Marital Estate 
liabilities 191,089 114,350 288,725 
Net worth, Marital estate 312,380 1,929,562 1,748,809 
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The trial court, in its Findings, dated November 11, 1974, thus 
resolved the dispute as to asset values entirely in favor of the 
Defendant. 
In both its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of November 
11 and its Judgment of December 18, 1974, the trial court divided 
the marital assets in roughly equal portions between the parties, but 
awarded a substantial beneficial interest in the speculative proper-
ties without equivalent debt and risk to the Defendant. 
The division of assets decreed in the lower court's Judg-
ments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 are summarized and com-
pared in Appendix A of the Plaintiff's brief. 
In determining whether the divisions of property decreed 
in the Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 have been 
inequitable, this Court must pass upon three issues. First, whether 
these divisions of property are likely to preserve the assets of 
the marital estate and encourage their continued growth and their 
ultimate liquidation for the benefit of both parties at their developed 
values. This determination of fact is to be made upon appeal 
according to the fair preponderance of the evidence. Jensen v. 
Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P.1034,1036 (1929). 
Second, if this Court finds, by the fair preponderance 
of the evidence, that the marital assets are not likely to be 
preserved for the benefit of the parties by those divisions of 
property, then this Court must determine whether the forced 
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liquidation of the marital estate at this stage of its development 
is inequitable or unjust to one or both of the parties. A third 
and related issue which this Court must pass upon in order to 
determine whether the divisions of property made by the court 
below are inequitable or unjust, is whether the Plaintiff would 
thereby be prevented from the practice of his profession and 
whether such prevention would be unjust. 
Will the property divisions decreed thus far by the trial 
court force the premature liquidation of the marital estate? 
To make this determination, the marital estate must be analyzed 
from the viewpoint of liquidity and the probability that its 
liquidity needs will be satisfied under the divisions of property 
decreed by the trial court. 
A simplified analysis of the marital property reveals 
that the total net worth of roughly $1,800,000 as found in the 
paragraph 8 of the Findings of November 11, 1974 (377 Record 379-80, 
306 Abstract at 309), consists of the home of the parties, valued 
at $100,000, fifty percent (50%) ownership of the stock of Major 
Enterprises, revalued by the trial court at roughly $550,000 
according to the value of the underlying apartments and land 
held by that corporation, fifty percent (50%) ownership of the 
St. George Sandpiper apartment complex, valued at roughly $70,000, 
the Seegmiller property, valued at roughly $400,000 and the 
eighty-two percent (82%) interest in the stock of Holidair Lands, 
a real estate holding company whose assets consist solely of 
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contract rights to purchase the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg 
lands, valued at roughly $200,000, and a contract receivable 
from Holidair Lands valued roughly at $500,000. 
Defining liquid assets as those that will yield current 
income or are readily marketable at their maximum value, few 
of the marital assets can be considered liquid. As previously 
discussed, the Nelson/Sandberg and Seegmiller properties, if 
disposed of immediately in the St. George area's wholesale real 
estate market, would bring but a small fraction of their maximum 
potential value. The contract receivable from Holidair Lands, 
if disposed of today in the contract receivables market at a 
competitive price, would bring less than one-third of its value 
at maturity. CPlaintiff!s Memorandum, 319 Record at 328, 267 
Abstract at 280). The fifty percent (50%) stock interest in 
Major Enterprises has no market value, representing a non-con-
trolling blockof restricted stock in a close corporation. By 
the Defendant's admission, such stock has as its only potential 
buyer the owner of the other fifty percent (50%) of the stock. 
That buyer has overcommitted all available personal and corporate 
funds to finance a large construction project and is financially 
incapable of purchasing the stock. Major Enterprises itself 
has experienced net operating losses,since 1974 and faces a 
current cash shortage of between $250,000 and $400,000 and, 
therefore, has no prospect of paying dividends. (Testimony of 
Verl O'Brien, 1350 Record at 1568-72, Affidavit of Verl O'Brien, 
dated November 15, 1974, 422 Record at 422-24, 352 Abstract at 
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The residence of the Plaintiff, though perhaps readily 
marketable, is not realistically available to the estate as a 
liquid asset because of the Defendants view that it is indispens-
able to her life style and must be retained. As a source of 
liquid funds, this leaves the parties fifty percent (50%) interest 
in the Sandpiper apartment complex and 3 acres of contiguous 
land. These apartments could be renovated to yield a net rental 
income to the estate of $200 per month. It is possible that 
$40,000, after taxes, could eventually be raised by a sale of 
the contiguous 3 acres at the fair market price asserted by the 
Defendant. 
The only other source of liquid capital is the Plaintiff's 
after tax salary of roughly $21,600 per year from the corporate 
complex. Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000) is paid per year 
to support the Defendant, $3,600 per year is used to support 
the Plaintiff and his wife, leaving approximately $5,000 in 
uncommitted salary per year available to retire the purchase 
money debts of the marital estate's business assets and finance 
their development. If the rental income from the Sandpiper 
apartments is added to that, there is available to this marital 
estate a total of $7,400 per year to satisfy the financial require-
ments of its business assets. This amount cannot even satisfy 
the annual interest payments due on the business assets of the 
estate. 
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The financial demands of this estate1s business 
assets are set forth in the Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record 
at 372, 218 Abstract of 239-40) and in the Affidavit in Support of 
Objections, dated November 14, 1974 (417 Record at 420, 343 Abstract 
at 347), The amounts contained therein are taken directly from 
the Plaintiff?s promissory notes received in evidence (255 Record 
at 255-61) and are unchallenged by the Defendant. Item 7D of 
the Plaintiff!s Affidavit in Support of Objections (417 Record at 
418, 343 Abstract at 346), discloses that interest on indebtedness 
incurred to acquire the business assets of the marital estate 
is accruing at the rate of roughly $950 per month or $11,500 
per year. The Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record at 372) dis-
closes approximately $145,000 of past due principal indebtedness 
incurred to acquire the business assets of the marital estate. 
Principal * indebtedness on purchase money obligations that will 
come due by the first month of 1976 include installment payments 
on business properties of approximately $85,000. By that time, 
the Plaintiff's matured business-related indebtedness will equal 
approximately $230,000. The marital estate will require another 
$50,000 to $75,000 in liquid funds as "seed moneyn to begin 
development of the raw land within the marital estate in order 
to set in motion the process by which liquid funds can be gen-
erated from an estate of this nature. 
The liquid funds required in the immediate future to 
prevent the premature liquidation of this marital estate at a 
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fraction of its potential value, are, therefore, approximately 
$280,000 to $300,000. The only available liquid funds being 
$7,200 per year plus, perhaps, $40,000 fr.om the sale of the land 
contiguous to the St. George Sandpiper apartments, the rest must 
be raised, if at all, by freeing the Seegmiller, Sandberg and 
Pershing Nelson properties from the present judgment liens imposed 
upon them so that the Plaintiff may employ them as collateral 
for loans to retire the outstanding purchase money debt and to 
use as seed money. 
The Plaintiff has the proven talent and ability as a 
real estate developer, the long experience with the real estate 
market in the St. George area, and the ability to attract the 
necessary investment funds to make large scale real estate devel-
opment on the property of the marital estate succeed, if given 
the opportunity. Any such prospect of successfully preserving 
and developing the marital assets will be foreclosed by the 
divisions of property heretofore decreed by the trial court, 
imposing, as they do, a routine division in kind upon the specu-
lative assets of the estate, awarding the beneficial interest 
therein to the Defendant outright, encumbering them with liens 
in favor of the Defendant, and still requiring the Plaintiff, 
without liquid funds and without the tools whereby liquid funds 
might be raised, to discharge the purchase money debt. 
The Plaintiff submits that a division of highly specu-
lative and non-liquid marital property in kind is justified only 
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where it is required to meet urgent material needs of one of 
the parties. It cannot be maintained that the Defendant has 
urgent material needs necessitating the liquidation of the marital 
estate in such a manner. The Defendant enjoys a $103,000 home, 
a country club membership and an income of $1,505 per month 
according to her own Affidavit, (213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract 
at 88) to support a household of three, double the income on 
which she supported a household of four prior to the divorce. 
A comparison of the financial condition of the respective parties 
taken from the Defendant's Affidavit of November 8, 1973 (213 
Record, 87 Abstract), the Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record, 
218 Abstract), and the Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Ob-
jections, dated November (417 Record, 343 Abstract) appears at 
Appendix B. 
A factor compounding the inequity of the property divisions 
adopted thus far by the lower court, is the requirement contained 
in paragraph 7D of the Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of November 
11, 1974, (377 Record at392, 306 Abstract at 320), and in paragraph 
5F of the Judgment of December 18, 1974, (443 Record at 448, 
390 Abstract at 395), that the Plaintiff shall be required to 
pledge his stock in Major Enterprises to the Court as security 
for the payment of the mortgage on the Seegmiller property and 
the payment of $50,000 in cash to the Defendant, with the pro-
vision that upon default, the stock is to be sold and the proceeds 
applied to the unsatisfied obligation. As previously noted, 
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the Plaintiff's sole source of income is his salary from Major 
Enterprises, plus small additional salaries from the other cor-
porations in the corporate complex founded by him. His stock 
ownership protects that salary. It was also noted previously 
that this stock is a non-controlling block of restricted stock 
in a closely held corporation, one that has experienced operating 
losses since 1974 and is currently suffering from a severe cash 
deficit. The remaining shareholder in Major Enterprises, who 
the Defendant has admitted is the only possible buyer of the 
Plaintiff's stock, has no uncommitted funds to purchase such 
stock. There being no market for the Plaintiff's Major Enterprises 
stock, a forced sale by the Court would contribute very little 
to paying any obligation secured by it. The only significant 
consequence of such a sale would be the loss of the Plaintiff's 
interest in Major Enterprises, jeopardizing his salary and only 
source of income. It has been noted that both of the divisions 
of property heretofore made by the trial court impose obligations 
upon the Plaintiff in excess of his income, leave no collateriz-
able assets at his disposal, and, therefore, make highly likely 
the Plaintiff's default and loss of his stock in Major Enterprises, 
the corporation he founded. 
There is an additional factor compounding the inequity 
of the property divisions thus far decreed by the lower court. 
Raw land has historically played a unique and indispensable role 
in the Plaintiff's practice of his profession as a developer of 
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large residential communities. He has held raw land in the form 
of options or low equity installment purchase contracts to serve 
as inventory in the production of homes and condominiums. At such 
time as development became appropriate and the land was needed as 
a component in the production of condominiums or subdivisions, it 
was then fully acquired. The land so acquired is unique. Its 
characteristics are as peculiarily suited to the requirements of 
the Plaintiff in the practice of his profession as the tools of a 
skilled craftsman are to his craft. A developer of large residential 
communities cannot practice his profession if he does not have at 
his disposal raw land of the right size, location and topography. 
To the Plaintiff such tracts of land are tools. The loss of those 
tools can prevent the practice of the Plaintiff's trade. The 
public policy of the bankruptcy laws to protect trademanfs tools 
is a public policy equally applicable to the facts of this case. 
This policy was basic to the trial court's reasoning in the original 
divorce decree wherein it left the speculative assets of the 
marital estate to the disposition of the Plaintiff, and retained 
limited jurisdiction to be exercised in the event that the disposition 
of those assets warranted an equitable modification of that decree. 
^Findings, Conclusions and Judgment dated June 26, 1972, 163 
Record at 170, 145 Abstract at 151). 
The Plaintiff submits that under either the standard 
of review established in Pahlberg or the more strict standard 
advocated in the Dahlberg dissent, it clearly works an inequity 
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and an injustice to both parties to reappraise a marital estate 
at eight times the value placed upon it in the original trial 
and at six times the value ever placed upon it as collateral 
by lending institutions, to divide the speculative business assets 
in kind, giving the beneficial interest in them to the Defen-
dant and the debt obligations to the Plaintiff, to encumber the 
business assets and nullify their value as collateral and to 
thereby force the premature liquidation of the estate at a frac-
tion of its potential developed value because the manner of 
dividing the estate has left no way by which the estatefs obliga-
tions can be met. 
As noted, the Defendant does not have urgent material 
needs requiring a division of the marital property in kind. 
The Plaintiff, however, does not propose to simply award the 
Plaintiff ^ the speculative business assets of the estate and 
exclude the Defendant from benefitting from their development. 
Rather the Plaintiff proposes that this Court instruct the lower 
court that equity requires that the Plaintiff be allowed the 
use of the estatefs speculative business assets unencumbered 
as inventory in his business of real estate development. Such 
disposition could be accompanied by a direction to the trial 
court to retain jurisdiction until such time as the speculative 
business assets are liquidated whether as improved or unimproved 
real estate. At the time of liquidation, the Defendant would 
be entitled to invoke the retained jurisdiction of the Court 
for the purpose of participating in the proceeds of the liquidated 
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assets in the form of an adjusted award of alimony, the Court 
at that time, taking into consideration all the circumstances 
to which equity would traditionally look. 
Such a disposition of the speculative business assets 
of the estate has substantial virtues. The most important is 
that it would afford the best chance that the full potential 
worth of these assets will be preserved for the benefit of both 
parties by removing the cloud of judgment liens over such assets 
and allowing their potential as collateral to be fully used. 
Since the actual value of these highly speculative assets is 
largely indeterminate, it allows both parties to benefit from the 
ultimate value of these properties whatever that value may become. 
It restores the parties more nearly to the economic status each 
enjoyed prior to the dissolution of the marriage, a prime objective 
of the divorce laws. McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1006 (1951). It does so because, by the great weight of 
the evidence, the Klein household as a whole, prior to the divorce, 
observed a frugal standard of living in order to make the maximum 
amount of funds available to assemble the business assets of the 
marital estate. (Modification Proceedings of July 1974, 1350 
record at 1486, Affidavit of the Plaintiff dated November 27, 
1973, 224 Record at 224, 99 Abstract at 99). The family had 
foregone consumption in the present in anticipation of substantial 
future rewards. Under a plan of retained jurisdiction for the 
purpose of adjustment of alimony, both parties would continue 
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to forego extravagant living in the present so that the prospect 
of substantial future rewards may be preserved. 
The practice of retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of 
using future alimony as a means of accomplishing an equitable 
division of a marital estate is solidly grounded in precedent. 
In Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948), the marital 
estate consisted of a home, certain annuities and securities 
and "certain speculative interests in mining ventures from which 
there is a possibility of paying defendant a substantial salary 
and capital gain on his investment.fl 
The trial court awarded the wife a share of the proceeds 
from the sale of the home and one-third of the estate's other 
liquid assets, but no share of the speculative mining interests. 
The wife, on appeal asserted her right to share in the speculative 
assets. 
The appellate court agreed that the wife had a right 
to share in the benefits of the speculative assets of the estate. 
But rather than undertake to divide assets of indeterminate value 
and attempting to credit the recipient with having received a 
certain portion of the value of marital estate, and rather than 
placing the unsuccessful marital partners in the position of 
future business partners by dividing the speculative assets in 
kind, the Wooley court directed the trial court to retain jurisdiction 
of the matter for the purpose of allowing the wife to share in 
the materialized values of the speculative assets through an 
-37-
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equitable adjustment of her award of alimony. The Wooley court 
went so far as to require that the trial court's original award 
be modified to include an award of alimony so that a method would 
be available to make future equitable adjustments in the financial 
circumstances of the wife. 195 P.2d at 745. 
Again, in Dahlberg v, Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 
C1930), a divorce was granted to the wife. The marital estate 
consisted of a small residential farm valued at $6,000. The 
trial court awarded the farm to the husband, giving the wife 
alimony of $10 per month and a cash award of $2,000. 
The wife, on appeal, asserted a right to half of the 
marital property on the ground that all the marital property 
had been acquired by the parties' joint efforts. 
The appellate court agreed that the trial court had 
erred in not finding the wife to be entitled to a larger share of 
the marital property. But rather than ordering a division of 
the farm in kind, or the sale of the farm and a division of the 
proceeds, the appellate court left the estate's income producing 
asset intact and directed the court to double the amount of 
alimony awarded the wife. 
The final, and possibly greatest, advantage of a property 
division which retains jurisdiction for the purpose of making 
an equitable adjustment of future alimony over a division in 
kind, is the psychological relief to both parties which would 
accompany such a division. In the Judgments of November 11, 
and December 18, 1974, the parties are made co-owners in one 
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form or another, of the St. George Sandpiper property, the 
Sandberg, Pershing Nelson, and Seegmiller properties, virtually 
all of the major assets of the marital estate. As stated in 
Wetzel v. Wetzel, 35 Wis. 103, 150 N.W.2d 482 (1967), wherein 
the husband appealed the award to him of a one-third interest 
in the business he had founded: 
In small estates, it may be that such a divi-
sion is the only possible division, but when there 
are sufficient assets as in the instant case, it 
would seem that any form of joint control or owner-
ship of assets by divorced persons should be avoided. 
The elimination of the source of strife and friction 
is to be sought and the financial affairs of the 
divorced parties separate as far as possible. If 
the parties cannot get along as husband and wife, 
it is not likely they will'get along as partners 
in business. (Emphasis added). 
Avoiding such continued post marital friction with 
respect to business matters was a prime concern of the court 
in its original decree of divorce which awarded to the Defen-
dant all the non-business assets of the marital estate and 
retained limited jurisdiction to adjust alimony as equity might 
require. (Transcript of Proceedings on Objections, 1011 Record at 
1020). To distribute marital property to meet the need for 
terminating personal friction between the parties is a practice 
grounded solidly in precedent. For example in Calderon v. 
Calderon, 9 Ariz. 538, 454 P.2d 586 (1969), the business owned 
by the parties was awarded to the husband. The court stated, 
at 454. P.2d at 590; 
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"Moreover, even if it be assumed for the sake of 
argument that a greater part of the community property 
was awarded to the defendant as a result of awarding 
him the business property, we would still be unable to 
agree with appellantTs suggestion that the business 
property be awarded to both parties as tenants-in-common.... 
There was ample evidence from which the trail court 
could conlude that the plan of distribution suggested 
by appellant would not only perpetuate the conflict 
between the parties, but would also be detrimental to 
the continued operation of the business." 
The Plaintiff submits that the injustice to both parties 
of forcing premature liquidation of this marital estate is clear, 
and that there is available an alternative method of dividing 
marital property, firmly sanctioned by the authorities of this 
jurisdiction, which will do equity to both parties without destroying 
the marital estate in the process. The Plaintiff.requests that 
this Court undertake to divide the marital property or, in the 
alternative, remand this cause to the trial court with the instruction 
that equity requires that the speculative assets of this marital 
estate not be divided but remain with the Plaintiff, and, further, 
that the trial court protect the Defendant by retaining jurisdiction 
for the purpose of adjusting the alimony awarded the Defendant 
at such time as these assets are liquidated by the Plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENTS HERETO 
RENDEREDHBT THE TRIAL COURT EXCEED THE JURISDICTION OF THAT 
COURT. 
In the present case, the original divorce decree 
was the subject of an appeal and a motion for a new trial, 
both of which were denied in Klein y. Klein, 30 Utah 2d 1, 511 
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P. 2d 1284 (1973). The Court referred in its opinion to the 
limited jurisdiction retained by the trial court as a possible 
avenue for relief from alleged inequities in the decree not 
sufficient to support a reversal or a new trial. That reser-
vation was quoted: 
The court further retains limited juris-
diction if within one year either party proves to 
be suffering serious financial distress be-
cause of the decree to be based on this decision 
and the ensuing deye1opments arising therefrom 
not capable of evaluation and effect at this time, 
the court will review its rulings and determine 
whether modifications should be made. (Emphasis 
added). 
It is true that the Supreme Court opinion gave a liberal 
construction to the wording of the reservation. It suggested 
a possible definition of "serious financial distress" as the 
inability of the Defendant to maintain her accustomed standard 
of living on the alimony and support provided. It also 
suggested that the distribution of assets under the original 
decree might be reexamined under the reservation. 
Although the Supreme Court speculated that alimony 
might be adjusted or assets redistributed within the terms of 
the reservation, the Court did not dispense with the prerequisites 
for doing so. By the terms of the reservation, those prerequisites 
are the allegation and proof of (1) suffering of serious 
financial distress, (2) due to ensuing developments (3) 
not capable of evaluation at the time of trial. 
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It is crucial to note that the Order of December 7, 1973 
authorized an "unrestricted" hearing of economic matters 
expressly upon the reasoning that an unrestricted hearing 
was necessary to ascertain whether "serious financial distress" 
was in fact suffered by either party and, if so, whether the 
limited jurisdiction reserved in the original decree should 
then be invoked. (Order, dated December 7, 1973, 233 Record at 
236, 105 Abstract at 109). It was for the purpose of making the 
determination of whether "serious financial distress" was in fact 
suffered by either party and, therefore, the reservation of limit 
jurisdiction should be invoked, that the Order of December 7, 197 
authorized the hearings of July 23, 26 and 29, 1974. The Order 
itself clearly left both questions to be determined by those 
hearings. The interlocutory appeal taken from that Order by 
the Plaintiff, which this Court declined to hear on February 
11, 1974, therefore, in no way disposed of the issue of juris-
diction in this matter. 
On October 24, 1973, the Defendant filed a Petition for 
Review of Economic Matters, together with an Affidavit of the 
Defendant dated November 8, 1973 to invoke the limited juris-
diction reserved in the original divorce decree. The Affidavit 
alleged that she was suffering hardship in so far as the parties 
pre-divorce level of consumption spending had been from $25,000 
to $30,000 per year, that her present income was $18,000 per 
year. (213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract at 88). 
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The Plaintiff filed a counteraffidavit, dated November 
27, 1974, showing his income tax returns for the previous four 
years which disclosed an average annual unadjusted gross income 
of approximately $22,000. It alleged that the Plaintiff had 
verified the expenses claimed in the Defendant's Affidavit by 
securing statements from the Defendant's creditors showing many 
of the expenses listed in the Defendant's Affidavit to be over-
stated from 2001 to 300%. (224 Record at 224-25, 99 Abstract at 
99-101.) Said income tax returns and creditor statements were 
received in evidence during the subsequent modification hearings 
and went unrebutted by the Defendant. In addition, the testimony 
of the Plaintiff that the Klein household had lived on a monthly 
disposable income including house payments of $700 per month 
went unrebutted at those hearings. 
The unrebutted evidence in this case is, therefore, 
that the present disposable income of the Defendant is at least 
twice the amount available to her before the original divorce 
decree. The only evidence offered by the Defendant to support 
a finding of nserious financial distress'1 is her testimony during 
the modification hearings, that her expenses exceeded her income 
since the original decree. Similarly, the only finding of "serious 
financial distress11 offered by the trial court was the mere 
conclusion that the Defendant had suffered such distress. In 
response to the Plaintiff's objection, the trial court offered 
to remedy the defectiveness of such finding by including figures 
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demonstrating that the Defendant's expenses had exceeded her 
income. (Proceedings of December 6, at page 17, 357 Abstract 
at 358). 
The Plaintiff submits that in light of the unrebutted 
evidence which shows the Defendant's present disposable income 
to be double its pre-divorce level, the mere fact that she has 
managed to squander even that income cannot, by any fair reading 
of the terms of the jurisdiction reserved in the original decree, 
be interpreted to constitute "serious financial distress" brought 
about by that decree and cannot serve as a basis for invoking the 
jurisdiction reserved in the original decree. 
Regardless of whether the trial court's finding with res-
pect to the Defendant's "serious financial distress" is sustained 
or rejected, the second and third prerequisites to invoking the 
limited jurisdiction reserved by the original decree remain unsatisfied 
Such "serious financial distress" as would justify invoking the 
reserved jurisdiction must arise from "ensuing developments", 
"not capable of evaluation at the time of trial." The function 
of the reservation, by its terms, is limited to functions that 
the trial itself could not perform, to issues that the trial 
process could not properly dispose of. Issues that clearly fall 
into the latter category are the equity or inequity of the division 
of property in the original decree and the value of the specu-
lative assets which were in the form of options and of contingent 
value at the time of the decree. These are the issues which 
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were subject to uncertainty at the time of the original trial 
and the issues about which the trial court expressed uncertainty 
when discussing its reservation of jurisdiction, (Hearings On 
Objections, 986 Record 1011, 53 Abstract at 56). But the issues 
of the value of the non-speculative assets of the estate, such as 
the Major Enterprises stock, the Sandpiper apartment complexes 
and contiguous lands held by Major Enterprises and O.K. Enterprises, 
clearly are subject to no such uncertainty. Whether or not their 
ultimate disposition is considered to be an issue within the 
scope of the reservation, their value clearly is not. Their 
value was fully litigated by both sides, those values have not 
changed significantly since they were first litigated and determined 
at the original trial. There have been no "ensuing developments" 
affecting those values and those non-speculative assets have 
no attributes which could be said to make them "not capable of 
evaluation at the time of trial". The Plaintiff, therefore, 
submits that issue of the value as distinct from the disposition 
of the non-speculative assets of the marital estate can not satisfy 
the second and third jurisdictional prerequisites imposed by 
the trial court. The Plaintiff requests that this Court accompany 
the remand of this case with the instruction that the issue of 
the value of the non-speculative assets of the marital estate, 
such as those held by Major Enterprises and O.K. Enterprises, 
and Major Enterprises1 stock, be excluded from the trial courtfs 
deliberations. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN 
ASSETS FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
It is the undisputed rule in this* and virtually all 
jurisdictions, that for purposes of the division of property 
in proceedings of divorce, the marital estate consists of those 
assets acquired through the joint efforts of the parties. Pinion 
v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937), a leading case estab-
lishing the factors to be considered in making an equitable 
division of marital property states at 67 P.2d 267-68: 
If she (the defendant) had helped to accumu-
late part of his fortune, she would ordinarily be entitled i 
to a substantial portion, at least of that which she | 
aided in accumulating, depending upon all the circum-
stances attending the accumulation. I 
I n
 McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), the ' 
husband was granted a divorce from his alcoholic wife. Assets 
that were accumulated entirely during the marriage were charac-
terized as having been acquired ffentirely through (the husband's) | 
efforts and salary, except $300 of hers which went into the i 
original house equity and the $6,900 from her inheritance.ff 
In Joiner v. Joiner, 131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938), I 
the husband moved to a new city for business reasons and the 
wife refused to follow, preferring to remain in the community | 
where she had put down her social roots. During the period of i 
amicable separation, the husband discovered oil on his oil 
leases "through his persistent, tireless and almost heroic I 
i 
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fortitude11 without which "these leases would never have been 
any substantial value to him.M 
The wife, on appeal, asserted a right to share in half 
of the value of the leases on the grounds that they were accumu-
lated with her "joint efforts". The court held, at 112 S.W.2d 
1053, that the wife; 
...did not by her labor, industry, skill, ability 
or earnings contribute anything to their acquisition... 
nor did she contribute anything to the domestic life 
of defendant while acquiring the original purchase 
money.... 
and therefore had no interest whatever in said properties. 
The Plaintiff, in the present case, has been separated 
from the Defendant since July, 1971. Since that time he 
has borrowed in excess of $98,080, including $16,750 from the 
modest savings of his aged mother. (Affidavit of Edna H. Roghaar, 
dated January 16, 1975, 462 Record at 462, 434 Abstract at 
434) to apply as purchase money on the Sandberg, Pershing Nelson 
and Seegmiller properties. With reference to the Seegmiller 
property in particular, this property existed within the Plaintiff's 
estate as an option due to expire on May 31, 1972. The Defendant 
was asked to co-sign the note and mortgage necessary to raise 
the $37,000 necessary to exercise the option. The Defendant 
refused. On May 18, 1972, a Memorandum Decision of Divorce 
was entered approving a proposed division of property in which 
the Seegmiller option would be retained by the Plaintiff. On 
May 25, 1972, the Plaintiff borrowed the necessary money to 
exercise the option. As in Joiner, the Plaintiff raised the 
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purchase money during a period when the Plaintiff received no 
contribution, either domestic or economic, from the Defendant. 
He obligated himself at considerable personal risk in order 
to exercise the Seegmiller option in reliance upon the Memorandum 
Decision of the court. The Defendant, after having refused 
to share in the risk of acquiring the Seegmiller property, will 
participate fully in the benefits of the Plaintiff's efforts, 
having been awarded under the modifying Judgments heretofore entered 
by the trial court, the beneficial interest in the Seegmiller 
property but none of the risks or debts. The Plaintiff submits 
that a proper application of the "joint efforts'1 doctrine and 
general equitable principles require that the trial court be 
instructed, upon remand, to exclude all or part of the Seegmiller 
property from the divisible marital estate, 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VALUING THE ASSETS OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE AS OF THE DATE OF THE MODIFICATION HEARINGS, 
The rule is well settled that the value of the property 
to be divided must be taken as of a date as near as possible to 
the date of dissolution of the marital community. Randolph v. 
Randolph, 118 Cal. 2d 584, 258 P.2d 547 (1953); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 
212 P.608, (Okl) (1923); Miller v. Miller, 157 N.W.2d 537 
S.D. (1968), The rule is summarized in 27B C.J.S. MDivorce and 
Separation" Section 295. 
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In the instant case, the Defendant has, in her own 
Affidavit and Motion of November 12, 1972, upon which the Order 
authorizing modification hearings is based, framed the issue of 
valuation to be the value of the marital estate at the time of 
the divorce decree. The trial court itself declared that the 
Defendant has so framed the issues and should be bound thereby. 
(Transcript of Modification Hearings, 1023 Record at 1077, 112 
Abstract at 133), Subsequently, after conferring with counsel 
in chambers, the trial court ruled that values would be taken 
as of the date of the hearing. The Plaintiff submits that such 
ruling is in direct conflict with the established rule governing 
valuation dates in matters of divorce and requests that this 
Court disregard evidence taken in conflict with the rule. Such 
error has greatly prejudiced the Plaintiff in that the Seegmiller 
property was merely an option on May 18, 1972 when the Memorandum 
Decision of divorce approving the original division of property 
was rendered. The Memorandum Decision containing all of the 
requisite elements of a judgment under Rule 54, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure should be considered the relevant valuation 
date. See United States v. F. $ M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 
U.S. 227, (1958) holding that intent controls the question of 
what constitutes a judgment. In addition, equity demands that 
the parties be entitled to rely on such an order in all subsequent 
transactions. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN MARITAL 
ASSETS ON ERRORS OF FACT AND OF LAW. 
The valuation of the marital estate at $1,800,000 is 
eight times the value placed upon it by the original Judgment 
of November, 1972 and six times greater than the value ever 
placed upon it as collateral by a lending institution. (Affidavit 
of Glen Saxton dated January 17, 1975, 465 Record at 466-67, 
436 Abstract at 436-38.) The values arrived at merely recite 
those asserted by the Defendant despite the tremendous discrepancy 
in the evidence of value taken. See table supra, at page 23. 
Such spectacular upward revaluations are entirely inconsistent 
with the values arrived at by prior judgments with those ascribed 
to the marital estate by the business community, yet entirely 
consistent with the values asserted by the Defendant. They were 
arrived at in total disregard of patent errors of fact of which 
the trial court was notified by the Plaintiff. These facts strongly 
suggest that the Plaintiff did not receive the independent 
judgment of the court with respect to the value of the marital 
property which is the fundamental entitlement of the Plaintiff. 
With respect to the Plaintiff's contract receivable 
from Holidair Lands, Inc., a real estate holding company, the 
contract amount of $504,000 receivable by the Plaintiff is not 
receivable by the Plaintiff until January 31, 1986. The unpaid 
balance due under the contract bears interest at 1-1/2% for 
the year 1972, and 8-1/2% for the year ending January, 1986, 
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with the interest rate increasing by 1/2% each intervening year, 
all of which appears on the face of the contract which was 
received in evidence. It is patently clear that the present 
value of the contract must, therefore, be discounted to reflect 
the difference between the contract interest rate and the market 
interest rate for contracts receivable. Assuming a then current 
prime rate of 91, the discounted value of the contract is $328,800 
rather than $504,000 as found by the trial court. Assuming 
a then current competitive interest rate on the contract receivable 
market of 18%, the present value of the Plaintiff's contract 
is $133,100.00. In failing to discount the Plaintiff's contract 
receivable, the error of the trial court is patent and beyond 
dispute and a new trial of this matter is required. 
With respect to the value of the Plaintiff's stock in 
Major Enterprises, the trial court valued that at $543,399.05, 
a value identical to that found by the court for the apartments 
and unimproved land held by Major Enterprises. The trial court 
equated the value of the corporation's stock with its underlying 
assets despite the following evidence before it. 
1) Plaintiff's stock constituted 50% of the 
stock of Major Enterprises, a closely held corporation; 
2) Such stock was subject to a right of first 
refusal held by Verl O'Brien, the owner of the remaining 
shares of Major Enterprises; 
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3) The Defendant, acknowledged that Mr. O'Brien 
was the only potential buyer of the Plaintiff's shares. 
(Page 19 of the Hearings and Objections of December 6, 
and 9, 1974); 
4) The assets of Major Enterprises were encum-
bered from $250,000 to $400,000 in excess of their value 
as collateral. (Testimony of Verl O'Brien, 1568, Record 
at 1568-72); 
5) Mr. O'Brien, the only potential buyer of the 
Plaintiff's stock, has no uncommitted liquid assets with 
which to purchase the Plaintiff's shares. 
The trial court equated the market value of the Plaintiff's 
stock with the value of its underlying assets. (Hearings on Objec-
tions, dated December 6 and 9, 1974, at page 17). It did so 
in total disregard of conclusive evidence that the Plaintiff's 
stock carried with it no power to liquidate the corporate assets, 
and that his stock was virtually unmarketable. 
By the great weight of authority, the fair market value 
of stock cannot be based on net asset value alone where that 
stock represents a minority interest with no power to force a 
liquidation of the corporate assets. In Whitman v. Whitman, 
34 Wis.2d 341, 149 N.W.2d 529, 532, the court held that Mwhere 
a minority stockholder is in no position to force a liquidation, 
a determination of fair market value cannot be based on liquidating 
values.'1 Even a majority interest cannot always be valued 
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according to net asset value alone, due to the difficulties 
inherent in liquidating the corporation or finding a buyer 
interested in all of the corporate assets. Estate of Gregg 
Maxcy, 28 T.C.M. 783 (1969). In each of the following cases, 
the valuation of stock based solely on the liquidation value 
of the assets.has been held reversible error. Estate of Gooding, 
269 Wis., 69 N.W.2d 586 (1965); Irene de Guebriant, 14 T.C. 
611 (.1950), rev, on other grounds 185 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1951); 
Lillian M. Schroeder, 13 T.C. 259 (1949); Charles W. Heppenstall, 
P-H Memo. T.C. 49,034; Elizabeth A. Wilson, P-H Memo. T.C. 
51,247; Wittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. Conn. 
1957); Paulina DuPont Dean, P-H Memo. T.C. 1960-54; Worthen 
v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961). 
The cases are unanimous in holding that the existence 
of a right of first refusal to buy stock at a stated price, 
such as that contained in exhibit 38-P governing the Plaintiff's 
Major Enterprises stock, serves to depress the market value 
of that stock. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d 
578 (1st Cir. 1943). In accord are the following cases involving 
the federal estate tax. A. Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947); F. A. Koch, 
28B.T.A. 363 (1933); Louise N. Schulz. 14 B.T.A. 419 (1928); 
L.E. Coutler, 7 T.C. 1280 (1946); Michigan Trust Co. 27 B.T.A. 
556 (1933); City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 23 B.T.A. 663 (1931); 
Eugene Kelley, P-H Memo TC 55,129; Isaac Baldwin, P-H Memo TC 
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1959-203; Matthews v, United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 
1964); Estate of P. G, Reynolds, 55 T.C. 172 (1970). 
The financial condition of a corporation and its capacity 
to pay dividends is likewise held to be an important factor 
in determining the value of closely held stock, Bader v. United 
States, 173 F.2d 833 CS.D. 111., N.D. 1959), Therefore, the trial 
court was legally obligated to consider the effect of the encumbrance 
of the assets of Major Enterprises of at least $250,000 in excess 
of their value. 
The Plaintiff submits that by valuing his stock in Major 
Enterprises according to the liquidation value of its assets 
alone, the trial court has committed reversible error, requiring 
a new trial of this matter. 
With respect to the amount of $504,000 which the court 
found Holidair Lands, Inc. obligated to pay the Plaintiff under 
a contract receivable, the Plaintiff testified (1350 Record at 1479), 
that the contract had been rescinded by the obligor and obligee 
by their mutual consent based upon a mutual mistake of fact 
as to the nature of the obligor's consideration received and 
a new modified contract had been agreed to which reduced the 
obligation of Holidair Lands to the Plaintiff from $504,000 
to $390,000. When the court expressed its confusion over the 
nature of this rescission and modification and the Plaintiff, 
in light of this confusion, moved for the taking of additional 
testimony, such motion was denied by the trial court. (Hearings 
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on Objections dated December 6 and 9, 1974 at page 40). The 
Plaintiff submits that in light of such uncertainty on the part 
of the trial court, and the proffer of proof made by the Plaintiff, 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
additional testimony to be taken in this matter. 
The Seegmiller property is a 1181 acre tract of arid, 
sagebrush covered desert on top of a mesa several miles from 
St. George. The validity of any appraised value of such property 
depends almost entirely upon the assumptions that are made about 
the availability of water. In this regard the testimony of 
the Defendant's expert appraiser is fatally defective and, 
therefore, the acceptance of that appraised value by the trial 
court is fatally defective as well. 
The Defendant's appraiser, Mr. Gus Johns, assumed that 
water was available to the Seegmiller property sufficient to 
develop the entire tract in ascribing a value of $352 per acre 
to it (1200 Record at 1291, 112 Abstract at 164). He conceded 
he made no direct investigation of the availability of water, 
the amount available, or the cost of obtaining it. (1200 Record 
at 1291, 112 Abstract at 164). The Court itself ruled that 
Mr. Johns was not qualified to give an expert opinion as to 
the availability of water to the Seegmiller property. (1200 
Record at 1275). Mr. Johns arrived at the $352 per acre value 
for the Seegmiller property by equating it to the Dixie Springs 
property, a 2,000 acre tract with 9.2 second feet of proven 
well water, and which sold for $370 per acre. From that, Mr. 
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Johns substracted an arbitrarily chosen figure of $18 per acre 
as the cost of placing water upon the Seegmiller property and 
concluded that the Seegmiller property was worth $352 per acre. 
Mr, Johns had earlier testified that the cost of drilling prospecting 
wells would be $60,000, which on a per acre basis is roughly 
triple the $18 per acre figure asserted elsewhere. 
On the other hand, the Plaintiff, as the owner, gave expert 
testimony that water was not available other than by prospecting 
for it by drilling and that he had been refused a drilling permit 
by the State Engineer. (1350 Record at 1461-62). 
The state of the record in this case, therefore, shows 
the testimony of Mr. Johns, inconsistent, based on hearsay and 
ruled incompetent by the court, that water was available to 
the Seegmiller property versus the competent testimony of the 
Plaintiff's direct knowledge that the availability of water 
to Seegmiller could not be determined without drilling and that 
permission to drill had been denied. The Plaintiff submits 
that the appraisal of the Seegmiller property was based upon 
the critical assumption of the availability of water, that that 
fact was not in evidence and that, therefore, the appraisal 
of the Plaintiff must be accepted by the trial court as the 
only competent evidence in the record as to the value of the 
Seegmiller property. 
-56-
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POINT VII 
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974, IF UPHELD BY 
THIS COURT, WILL MAKE LAWSUITS BY THIRD PARTIES NECESSARY TO 
PROTECT THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS; 
The Judgments of November 11 and of December 18, 1974, 
entered by the trial court impose a $600 per acre security 
interest in favor of the Defendant in the installment land pur-
chase contracts to the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg properties 
which rights are the property of Holidair Lands, Inc. They impose, 
as well, a lien in favor of the Defendant of $600 per acre upon 
the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg properties, title to which is 
held by Holidair Lands, Inc. (Judgment of November 11, 1974, 
338 Record at 405, 328 Abstract at 333-34). 
Richard Rogers is the holder of 17-1/2% of the out-
standing shares of Holidair Lands. The above-described Judgments 
clearly impose a security interest and a lien upon the interests 
of Richard Rogers, as a minority stockholder, in the assets of 
Holidair Lands, Inc. 
Similarly, there exists in Verl O'Brien, a holder of 
50% of the shares of Major Enterprises, an option to buy the 
stock held by the Plaintiff in Major Enterprises at a predeter-
mined price, payable according to an established schedule. The 
Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 entered by the 
trial court, require the stock of the Plaintiff which is subject 
to the option rights of Verl O'Brien, to be pledged to the court 
as security and sold upon the default of certain obligations 
imposed upon the Plaintiff by those Judgments. 
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The law is undisputed that a court may not enter any 
decree of divorce affecting the interests of third persons not 
made a party to the divorce action. Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 
201, 200 P.2d 251 (1948); Greco v. Foster; 268 P.2d 215 (Okl. 1954); 
Potter v. Potter, 35 Wash. 2d 788, 215 P.2d 704 (1950). 
The Plaintiff submits that the third party interests bur-
dened by the aforementioned Judgments of the trial court render 
those Judgments contrary to law and require a new trial of this 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The alleged stipulation by the Plaintiff to the Judgment 
of December 18, 1974 dividing the marital assets is null and void. 
The incapacity of the Plaintiff under the circumstances to contract 
is demonstrated by the record and sufficient to rescind an ordinary 
contract in equity, a higher standard than applies to stipulations 
in matters of divorce. The entry of a consent judgment by the trial 
court subsequent to the withdrawal of the Plaintiff's consent 
constitutes an irregularity of the court under the strong majority 
rule of Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar and is grounds for a new 
trial of this matter. 
Though there is no extant judgment in this action, the 
hardship that would otherwise result to both parties requires 
review at this time of the unambiguous position heretofore taken 
by the trial court is manifest. It imposes financial obligations 
upon the Plaintiff far greater than his income, encumbers the 
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business assets of the estate so as to nullify their value as 
collateral, and thereby forces the liquidation of the estate at 
a fraction of its potential worth. This manifest inequity to 
both parties could be avoided by dividing the marital estate so as 
to leave its speculative business assets to the Plaintiff to be 
developed, and protecting the right of the Defendant to benefit 
therefrom by retaining jurisdiction to be invoked for the purpose 
of making an equitable adjustment of the alimony awarded the Defen-
dant at such time as those assets are liquidated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH $ PLUMB 
B7 C h^ks^s/J , 
^ ' Orrin G.^H/tilh ^ — 
i 
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APPENDIX A-l 
MODIFIED ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT, SET FORTH AT PARAGRAPHS 2-7 OF JUDGMENT DATED NOVEMBER 
11, 1974: 
(A) Alimony per month $ 300.00 
(B) Child support for three children . 
per month 300.00 
(C) Mortgage, tax and insurance payments 
on residence per month 350.00 
(D) All medical expenses of minor children Unvalued 
(E) Beneficial interest in certain life 
insurance policies Unvalued 
(F) Attorney's fees 4,250.00 
(G) Liquidated stock 7,000.00 
(H) Home of parties, Plaintiff to assume 
the $30,000 mortgage, taxes and 
insurance premiums1 103,000.00 
(I) Membership in Willow Creek Country 
Club 2,580.00 
(J) Undivided one-half interest in 
St. George Sandpiper Apartments and 
6.2 acres of contiguous raw land, net 
of mortgage 68,500.00 
(K) Seegmiller property, consisting of 
1181,.56 acres. Plaintiff to pay 
mortgage of $72,507 within three (3) 
years, such payment to be secured by 
pledging Plaintiff1s stock in Major 
Enterprises to be sold upon default 
of mortgage obligation 416,064.00 
(L) Undivided one-half interest in a con-
tract payable by Holidair Lands, Inc. 
to Plaintiff. Such interest secured 
by a lien of $600 per acre on Pershing 
Nelson and Sandberg properties owned by 
Holidair Lands, Inc. 252,000.00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT 842,144.00 
Monthly mortgage, tax and insurance payments reflected in Item C. 
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APPENDIX A-2 
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENDANT, SET FORTH 
AT PARAGRAPH 9, JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974: 
(A) The short and long-term debts on 
the Sandpiper Apartments in St. George 
and contiguous acreage $73,000.00 
(B) Note payable to Dynamic Corporation 
for Willow Creek Country Club Member-
ship 1,920.00 
(C) The miscellaneous outstanding bills 
and debts of the Defendant as of 
July 28, 1974, as follows: 
Castleton's 
J. C. Penney Company 
Bud's Hardware 
Sprinklers 
Kimrey's 
Makoff 
Utah Spraying 
Morley Sprague 
Goodyear Tire Company 
Beehive Insurance 
Owen's (Boys' Shoes) 
Wally Sandack 
Homer Smith 
LDS Hospital 
Salt Lake Water Conservancy 
District 
Salt Lake Clinic 
Mountain Fuel Supply Cc 
Engh Floral 
>mpany 
Willow Creek Country Club 
Great Garb 
Jak's 
Cottonwood Sanitary Dis 
MONY (Insurance Policy 
Douglas) 
Dee Call 
Zinik's 
Chesley Drug 
Glover Nursery 
Wolfe's 
Bullock's 
Winder Dairy 
Dr. Holbrook 
strict 
for 
Costs of litigation, including 
402.72 
85.24 
46.52 
22,64 
87.19 
169.88 
44.00 
35.00 
357.65 
172.00 
71.56 
30.00 
20.00 
6.45 
17.38 
16.52 
60.39 
31.82 
337.06 
174.42 
41.44 
19.35 
30.04 
10.00 
60.24 
5.90 
106.09 
103.50 
3.36 
59.75 
15.00 
initial appraisal expenses 
and depositions 1,073.76 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Valley Bank § Trust Company 2,573.97 
Mrs. C. W. Pressler 4,000.00 
Imperial Realty 253.98 
Automobile Repairs not covered 
by insurance 70.02 
Due to Marcellus Palmer for 
Appraisal 350.00 
Due to Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss 
Campbell § Cowley, attorney's 
fees and costs 11,000.00 
Due Augustus Johns for 
Appraisal 1,971.81 
Total $ 23,936.65 
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY 
DEFENDANT $ 98,856.65 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDANT $842,144.00 
LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS 98,856.65 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT, NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT $743,287.35 
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APPENDIX A-3 
MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 8, JUDGMENT 
OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974: 
(A) Stock in Major Enterprises (subject 
to the security interest of the 
Defendant $ 543,399.05 
(B) Stock in Holidair Lands, Inc. 196,762.50 
(C) Undivided one-half interest in contract 
payable by Holidair Lands 252,000.00 
(D) Stock in Award Homes, Inc. 59,369.86 
(E) Stock in Dynamic Corporation 4,543.55 
(F) Plaintiff's profit sharing trust 47,850.00 
(G) Contract receivable from Harmon Johnson 17,546.67 
Total Assets Awarded the Plaintiff $1,121,471.63 
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BY THE PLAINTIFF 
APPENDIX A-4 
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 10, 
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974: 
All debts and obligations incurr-ed during the marriage not 
allocated to the Defendant, specifically including, but not necessaril> 
limited to, the following, to be paid and discharged by the Plaintiff 
Notes payable to Valley Bank § Trust Company 
- secured by a mortgage on the Seegmiller 
Land $ 72,507.00 
Note payable, secured by a mortgage on Salt 
Lake City residence 29,400.00 
Note payable to Mary Warren, with accrued 
interest 18,700.00 
Note payable to American Equity " 5,600.00 
Notes payable to Major Enterprises 25,562.00 
Note payable to Carl Ohran 5,900.00 
Account payable to Bowles 1,000.00 
Current legal fees payable re Sandberg 
litigation 1,200.00 
Note payable to O.K. Enterprises 2,250.00 
Fees payable to Harley W. Gustin, Esq. 4,250.00 
Fees payable to James R. Brown, Esq. 7,000.00 
Other miscellaneous payables 1,500.00 
Allowance for additional attorney's fees for 
the Plaintiff, and for other miscellaneous 
debts of the Plaintiff upon which there is 
no testimony 15,000.00 
i 
TOTAL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED $189,869.00 I 
V UB DT T M T C C — • 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff was ordered 
and directed to pay and discharge all business obligations 
incurred by him and/or Defendant (excluding those which the 
Defendant was specifically ordered and directed to discharge), 
either directly or indirectly or through their guarantee of 
corporate obligations, and to save and hold Defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF $ 189,869,00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF $1,121,471.63 
LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS
 5 189,869.00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, 
NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT $ 931,602.63 
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APPENDIX A-5 
MODIFIED ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT, SET FORTH AT PARAGRAPHS 1-5 OF JUDGMENT DATED DECEMBER 
18, 1974: 
(A) Alimony per month $ 300.00 
(B) Child support for three children 
per month 300.00 
(C) Mortgage, tax and insurance payments 
on residence per month 350.00 
(D) All medical expenses of minor children Unvalued 
(E) Beneficial interest in certain life 
insurance policies Unvalued 
(F) Attorneys fees 4,250.00 
(G) Liquidated stock 7,000.00 
(H) Home of parties, Plaintiff to assume 
the $30,000 mortgage, taxes and 
insurance premiums-*- 103,000.00 
(I) Membership in Willow Creek Country 
Club 3,500.0-0 
(J) St. George Sandpiper Apartments in fee 
simple, net of mortgage 33,000.00 
(K) Undivided one-half interest in 
Seegmiller property, consisting of 
1181.56 acres. Plaintiff to divide the 
property into two parcels, Defendant to 
select either resulting parcel at her 
election. Plaintiff to pay 
mortgage of $72,507 within three (3) 
years, such payment to be secured by 
pledging Plaintiff1s stock in Major 
Enterprises to be sold upon default 
of mortgage obligation 208,000.00 i (L) Undivided one-half nterest in a con-
tract payable by Holidair Lands, Inc. 
to Plaintiff, Sucli interest secured • • 
by a lien of $600 per acre on Pershing I 
Nelson and Sandberg properties owned by 
Holidair Lands, Inc. 252,000.00 
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(M) Defendant to receive from Plaintiff 
$50,000 in payments of $5,000, commencing 
April 1, 1975 and ending April 1, 1983. 
Such payment to be secured by pledging 
Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises 
to be sold upon Plaintiff's default 50,000.00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT $649,500.00 
-2-
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APPENDIX A-6 
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENDANT, SET FORTH 
AT PARAGRAPHS 9-10, JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974: 
(A) The long-term debts only secured by 
the Sandpiper Apartments in St. George 
and contiguous acreage 
(B) The miscellaneous outstanding bills 
and debts of the Defendant as of 
July 28, 1974, as follows: 
Castleton's 
J. C. Penney Company 
Bud's Hardware 
Sprinklers 
Kimrey's 
Makoff 
Utah Spraying 
Morley Sprague 
Goodyear Tire Company 
Beehive Insurance Owen's (Boys' Shoes) 
Wally Sandack 
Homer Smith 
LDS Hospital 
Salt Lake Water Conservancy 
District 
Salt Lake Clinic 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
Engh Floral 
Willow Creek Country Club 
Great Garb 
Jak's 
Cottonwood Sanitary District 
MONY (Insurance Policy for 
Douglas) 
Dee Call 
Zinik's 
Chesley Drug 
Glover Nursery 
Wolfe's 
Bullock's 
Winder Dairy 
Dr. Holbrook 
Costs of litigation, including 
initial appraisal expenses 
and depositions 
Valley Bank § Trust Company 
Mrs. C. W. Pressler 
Imperial Realty 
Automobile Repairs not covered 
by insurance 
402 
85 
46 
72 
24 
52 
22,64 
87.19 
169, 
44, 
35, 
357, 
172, 
71. 
30, 
20. 
17. 
16. 
60. 
31, 
337, 
174, 
41, 
19, 
30, 
10. 
60, 
5, 
106, 
103, 
3, 
59, 
15 
88 
00 
00 
65 
00 
.56 
00 
00 
6.45 
38 
52 
39 
82 
06 
42 
44 
35 
04 
00 
24 
90 
09 
50 
36 
75 
00 
1,073.76 
2,573.97 
4,000.00 
253.98 
70.02 
$73,000.00 
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Due to Marcellus Palmer for 
Appraisal 350.00 
Due to Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss 
Campbell § Cowley, attorney's 
fees and costs 11,000.00 
Due Augustus Johns for 
Appraisal 1,971.81 
Total $ 
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY 
DEFENDANT $ 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDANT $ 
LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT, NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT $ 
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APPENDIX A-7 
MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPHS 6-8, JUDGMENT 
OF DECEMBER 18, 19 74: 
(A) Stock in Major Enterprises (subject 
to the security interest of the 
Defendant $ 543,399.05 
(B) Stock in Holidair Lands, Inc. 196,762.50 
(C) Undivided one-half interest in contract 
payable by Holidair Lands 252,000.00 
(D) Stock in Award Homes, Inc. 59,369.86 
(E) Stock in Dynamic Corporation . 4,543.55 
(F) Plaintiff's profit sharing trust 47,850.00 
(G) Contract receivable from Harmon Johnson 17,546.67 
(H) Undivided one-half interest in 
Seegmiller property, consisting of 
1181.56 acres. Plaintiff to divide the 
property into two parcels. Defendant to 
select either resulting parcel at her 
election. Plaintiff to pay mortgage of 
$72,507 within three years, such pay-
ments to be secured by pledging Plaintifffs 
stock in Major Enterprises to be sold 
upon default of mortgage obligation 208,064.00 
(I) 6.2 acres of raw land contiguous to 
St. George Sandpiper apartments 60,000.00 
Total Assets Awarded the Plaintiff $1,389.535.63 
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APPENDIX A-8 
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 11, 
JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 19 74: 
All debts and obligations incurred during the marriage not 
allocated to the Defendant, specifically including, but not necessarily 
limited to, the following, to be paid and dischraged by the Plaintiff: 
Notes payable to Valley Bank § Trust Company 
secured by a mortgage on the Seegmiller 
Land $ 72,507.00 
Note payable, secured by a mortgage on Salt 
Lake City residence 29,400.00 
Note payable to Mary Warren, with accrued 
interest 18,700.00 
Note payable to American Equity 5,600.00 
Notes payable to Major Enterprises 25,562.00 
Note payable to Carl Ohran 5,900.00 
Account payable to Bowles 1,000.00 
Current legal fees payable re Sandberg 
litigation 1,200.00 
Note payable to O.K. Enterprises 2,250.00 
Fees payable to Harley W, Gustin, Esq. 4,250.00 
Fees payable to James Pv. Brown, Esq. 7,000.00 
Other miscellaneous payables 1,500.00 
Allowance for additional attorney's fees for 
the Plaintiff, and for other miscellaneous 
debts of the Plaintiff upon which there is 
no testimony 15,000.00 
Short term debt on St. George Sandpiper 
apartments not calculated 
TOTAL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED 
BY THE PLAINTIFF $189,869.00 
In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff was ordered 
and directed to pay and discharge all business obligations 
incurred by him and/or Defendant (excluding those which the 
Defendant was specifically ordered and directed to discharge), 
either directly or indirectly or through their guarantee of 
corporate obligations, and to save and hold Defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF $ 189,869.00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF $1,389,535.63 
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LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS 189,869.00 
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, 
NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT $1,199,666.63 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B-l 
MONTHLY INCOME OF THE DEFENDANT AS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANTS AFFIDAVIT 
DATED NOVEMBER 8, 1973 (213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract at 88): 
(A) Gross alimony and child support .$ 600.00 
(B) Monthly earnings as real estate agent 500.00 
(C) House payments received from Plaintiff 358.00 
(D) Willow Creek Country Club dues 47.00 
(E) Insurance and medical expenses received -i 
from Plaintiff 140.00 
$1,645.00 
MONTHLY INCOME OF THE PLAINTIFF AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
(357 Record at 372, 218 Abstract at 239) AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTIONS C417 Record at 418, 343 Abstract at 345): 
Net Amount 
Gross Amount After taxes 
(A) .Salary from Major Enterprises, 
Inc. $1,800.00 $1,256.46 
(B) Salary from Award Homes, Inc. 125.00 117.00 
(C) Salary from Dynamic Corp. 90.00 65.28 
$2,015.00 $1,436.74 
lAmount listed as unknown in Defendant's Affidavit. Amount of $140.00 
therefore, supplied from Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record at 
372, 218 Abstract at 239). 
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APPENDIX B-2 
MONTHLY EXPENSES OF THE PLAINTIFF AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS (417 Record at 418, 343 Abstract at 345): 
(A) Alimony and child support $ 600.00 
(B) Mortgage on home with taxes and 
insurance 358.00 
(C) Medical expenses Con children) 100.00 
(D) Interest on loan Oith no appli-
cation to principal and exclud-
ing land purchase obligations) 955.06 
(E) Life insurance premiums 40.00 
$2,053.06! 
To Plaintiff's total monthly expenses should be added $300 for the 
living expenses of the Plaintiff and his present wife. The 
monthly expenses imposed upon the Plaintiff by the divisions 
of property heretofore made by the trial court, therefore, 
exceed the Plaintiff's monthly gross income by $338.05 and the 
Plaintiff's monthly income net of taxes by $916.32. 
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APPENDIX B-3 
PRINCIPAL INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF TOGETHER WITH MATURITY DATES 
AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM (357 Record at 372, 218 
Abstract at 240) ALL OF WHICH REMAIN OUTSTANDING AS OF JULY, 1975: 
OBLIGATION 
Harley Gustin 
Carl Ohran 
Mary Warren 
Major (on purchase of 
6.2 acres) 
Mary Warren 
0 K Enterprises 
Valley Bank 
Major 
Ma j or 
Maj or 
Nelson Contract 
American Equity 
Sandberg payment 
AMOUNT 
$ 4,250.00 
5,900.00 
9,800.00 
6,500.00 
9,800.00 
2,250.00 
72,507.00 
3,500.00 
10,428.00 
10,512.00 
10,000.00: 
5,300.00 
71,000.00 
$221,747.00 
DUE 
Judgment, past due 
Past due, threatened suit 
April 10, 1973 
June, 1973 
April 10, 1974 
July 30, 1974 
August 1, 1974 
August 31, 1974 
September 1, 1974 
January 1, 1975 
January 14, 1975 
June 12, 1976 
All past due but 
dependent upon litigation 
Although this installment payment has since been discharged by the 
Plaintiff, he did so by borrowing $10,000 from his mother, 
Mrs. Edna Roghaar and from Richard Rogers. Therefore, the 
Plaintiff's total indebtedness remains unchanged from that 
shown above. 
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